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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Patrick Anthony Morrissey appeals from his judgment of conviction for
first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree arson, and an enhancement
for being a persistent violator.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In exchange for cancellation of a $300 debt, Morrissey burned Spencer
Maschek's car so Maschek could collect the insurance proceeds and pay off the
debt owed on the car because Maschek could no longer make the payments.
(R., pp. 10-13.) The state charged Morrissey with conspiracy to commit firstdegree arson, first-degree arson, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.
39-42.) After a trial, the jury found Morrissey guilty as charged. (R., pp. 180, 18283.)
After entering the verdicts, the district court scheduled the sentencing to
coincide with pending probation violation dispositions and ordered an updated
pre-sentence investigation. (Tr., p. 521, Ls. 6-13.) The district court then asked
Morrissey's counsel if there were "other evaluations that [the defense] would
request as part of that addendum?" (Tr., p. 521, Ls. 14-15.) Morrissey's counsel
responded, "No, Your Honor." (Tr., p. 521, L. 16.) The district court then directly
addressed Morrissey, explained his right to silence in relation to sentencing, and
encouraged him to talk to his counsel about his sentencing options and choices.
(Tr., p. 521, L. 17 - p. 522, L. 5.)
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The matter proceeded to sentencing where the district court imposed
concurrent sentences of 15 years with five years fixed, to run consecutive to
previously imposed sentences. (R., pp. 201-02.) Morrissey appealed after his
appeal rights were reinstated by post-conviction proceedings.
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ISSUES

Morrissey states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err by failing to order a mental health
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, as the court had
reason to believe that Mr. Morrissey's mental condition
would be a significant factor at sentencing, and was the error
harmless?

2.

Did the district court abuse it discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Morrissey failed to show that it would be appropriate for this Court to
reach his claim of error in the lack of a psychological evaluation, raised for
the first time on appeal after Morrissey declined sentencing evaluations in
the trial court?

2.

Has Morrissey failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Morrissey Has Failed To Show That It Would Be Appropriate For This Court To
Reach His Claim Of Error In The Lack Of A Psychological Evaluation, Raised For
The First Time On Appeal After Morrissey Declined Sentencing Evaluations In
The Trial Court
A.

Introduction
In 2005 Morrissey was convicted of grand theft. (PSI, pp. 4-5.) In 2006

Morrissey was convicted of aiding and abetting burglary and a separate burglary.
(PSI, p. 5.) As part of the sentencing processes in those other matters several
evaluations and other mental health records were put before the court.

(See,

~ , PSI, pp. 12, 46-68. 1) A 2004 discharge summary stated, "Should the patient
engage in recurrent illegal activity, it is recommended that he be sent to a penal
institution rather than a mental health institution. It was shown that he cannot
voluntarily cooperate with care."

(PSI, p. 48.)

Despite this information, the

district court placed Morrissey on probation after his first felony, and then on a
rider and back on probation after his next two felonies. (PSI, pp. 5-6.) Morrissey
then committed the instant offenses while on probation for the three prior
felonies.
At the conclusion of the trial in this case the district court ordered an
updated PSI and specifically asked Morrissey if he wanted any "other

1

Because the other felony cases were before the court for disposition of
probation violations it appears that the court considered the 2005 PSI in
sentencing in this case. (Tr., p. 525, Ls. 6-15.) That PSI is not included in the
present record, even though it apparently contained additional information about
Morrissey's mental health. (PSI, p. 12.) Missing portions of the record must be
presumed to support the district court's decisions. State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho
804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996).
4

evaluations" for sentencing. (Tr., p. 521, Ls. 8-15.) Morrissey, through counsel,
declined. (Tr., p. 521, L 16.) The court then informed Morrissey of his right to
silence at sentencing and encouraged him to discuss his sentencing options and
choices with counsel.

(Tr., p. 521, L 17 - p. 522, L. 5.)

Morrissey did not

thereafter request any evaluations for sentencing. (See generally, R.)
On appeal, for the first time, Morrissey argues that it was error to proceed
to sentencing without a psychological evaluation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-11.}
Morrissey is estopped from making that argument because he specifically told
the court through counsel that he was not requesting any evaluations for
sentencing.

Even if not estopped, Morrissey has failed to show fundamental

error-in fact, he does not even claim fundamental error, but instead claims that
the statute in question, I.C. § 19-2522, specifically provides for appellate review
in the absence of any objection. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-10.) His argument is
meritless, however, because I.C. § 19-2522 is silent as to legal standards of
appellate review.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).

5

C.

Morrissey's Claim Of Error Cannot Be Reviewed On Appeal
Morrissey's claim of error in the lack of a psychological evaluation is

barred because the error was invited. "The doctrine of invited error applies to
estop a party from asserting an error when his or her own conduct induces the
commission of the error." State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88
(Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654,657
(Ct. App. 1993)). The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party
who "caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court" to take a
particular action from "later challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Blake,
133 Idaho 237,240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). "One may not complain of errors
one has consented to or acquiesced in." Norton, 151 Idaho at 187, 254 P.3d at
88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State
v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998)). The invited
error doctrine applies to sentencing decisions, as well as to rulings made during
trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 863, 866 (Ct. App. 1990).
At the conclusion of trial and after ordering an updated PSI, the district
court specifically asked the defense if it wished to have "other evaluations" as
part of the updated PSI. (Tr., p. 521, Ls. 8-15.) The defense responded, "No."
(Tr., p. 521, L. 16.) Having specifically stated a desire that no further evaluations
be performed, Morrissey is estopped from asserting the district court erred by not
ordering a psychological evaluation as part of the updated PSI.
Even if he is not estopped from raising this claim, Morrissey's claim of
error fails because it is not preserved. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that

6

"when an error has not been properly preserved for appeal through objection at
trial, the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to
cases where the error results in the defendant being deprived of his or her
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." Perry,
150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. Thus, "where an error has occurred at trial
and was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, such error shall only be
reviewed where the defendant demonstrates to an appellate court that one of his
unwaived constitutional rights was plainly violated."

~

at 226, 245 P.3d at 978

(emphasis added). "[l]n the absence of a timely objection in the trial court, relief
will be afforded on appeal for an error in a criminal trial only if the defendant
shows that it amounts to fundamental error." State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24,
_ , 266 P.3d 499, 508 (Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added).
Morrissey did not preserve his appellate claim below and makes no
attempt to demonstrate fundamental error in this appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.
5-8.)

Any effort to establish fundamental error would be doomed to failure

because there is no constitutional right to a court-ordered psychological
evaluation for sentencing. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (first
prong of fundamental error analysis requires appellant to show that his
"unwaived constitutional rights were violated").

Because Morrissey's appellate

claim of error was not preserved and has not been shown to be fundamental
error this Court cannot review it.
Morrissey makes no argument that appellate review of his unpreserved
claim of error is appropriate. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-11.) The closest he comes
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is an argument that the district court should have ruled on the necessity of an
evaluation in the absence of an objection. (Appellant's brief, p. 8 ("By the plain
language of the statute itself, the obligation to order an evaluation is upon the
sentencing court and is not dependent upon a request from either the State or
the defendant. I.C. § 19-2522(1).").) This argument is ultimately irrelevant to the
question of whether this Court should reach Morrissey's appellate claim of error.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v.
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because "the
best guide to legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho
326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).

Where the statutory language is

unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written.
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores. Inc., 142 Idaho 810,813, 135 P.3d 756, 759
(2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one reasonable
interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that interpretation. Verska
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96, 265 P.3d 502,
508-09 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect
to unambiguous language of statute if such was "palpably absurd").
Idaho Code section 19-2522(1) provides that the trial court "shall" order a
psychological evaluation if there is "reason to believe" mental health will be a
significant factor at sentencing and "for good cause shown." LC. § 19-2522(1 ).
The language of this statute, plain or otherwise, says nothing about appellate
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review. Morrissey has failed to articulate why any language of the statute has
any relevance to standards of appellate review, much less that the legislature
intended to do away with the requirement that appellate claims be either
preserved or shown to be fundamental error.
Morrissey argues that I.C. § 19-2522(1) imposes a mandatory duty on the
trial court to order an evaluation in appropriate cases regardless of whether the
parties have requested such an evaluation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.2) Implicit
in this argument is the claim that by removing the trial court's discretion the
legislature also eliminated the requirement of preserving claims of error for
appellate review. This unarticulated argument is meritless. The fundamental
error rule is not limited to only the discretionary decisions of the trial court. A
directive that the trial court "shall" do something is irrelevant to whether the
appellate court will review an unpreserved claim of error.

The assumption

necessary to complete Morrissey's argument, that limiting the trial court's
discretion by use of the phrase "court shall" is a plain legislative directive that the
normal rules of preservation of appellate issues do not apply, is not supported by
the plain language of the statute.

2

The phrase "for good cause shown" in LC. § 19-2522(1) shows that Morrissey's
basic premise-that a trial court has the obligation in every criminal case to
search the record and evaluate the need for a psychological evaluation and rule
on that issue regardless of the lack of a motion-is also without merit.
9

In addition, Morrissey's argument lacks support in the law. The phrase
"court shall" appears over 1,000 times in the Idaho Code. (Search for phrase
"court shall" in Westlaw database for the Idaho Code, unannotated.) The phrase
appears 97 times in titles 18 (criminal code) and 19 (criminal procedure) alone.
(Same search.) Despite the ubiquity of this phrase in the Idaho Code, Morrissey
can cite to no authority that the language he relies on has ever been held to do
away with the requirement that parties preserve objections for appellate review.
It is telling that Morrissey cannot find a single instance where the phrase "court
shall" has even been deemed relevant to whether an issue has been preserved
for appellate review despite the fact that the phrase is common in the Idaho
Code.
Morrissey has offered no argument why this Court should consider his
unpreserved claim of error.

The assumption he apparently makes, that the

legislature has done away with the requirement of preservation, does not
withstand analysis.

Even if the alleged error were not invited, because it was

neither preserved nor shown to be fundamental error, Morrissey's appellate claim
cannot be addressed.

11.
Morrissey Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court imposed concurrent sentences of 15 years with five

years fixed, to run consecutive to previously imposed sentences. (R., pp. 20102.) Morrissey claims the district court abused its sentencing discretion "in light
10

of mitigating evidence."

(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13.)

Review of the record

shows no abuse of sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.

C.

l9..:

Morrissey's Sentence Is Reasonable In Light Of The Nature Of The Crime
And Morrissey's Character
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To
establish that the sentence is excessive, Morrissey must demonstrate that
reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish
the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining whether
the appellant met his burden, the Court considers the entire sentence but,
because the decision to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the
executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of
actual incarceration.

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391

(2007).
The two felony convictions at issue are Morrissey's fourth and fifth in
about three years. (PSI, pp. 4-6.) They were committed while Morrissey was on
11

probation for three other felonies (and two of the prior felonies were committed
while on probation for the first). (Id.) All of the felonies represented theft-related
property crimes. (Id.)
The district court applied the relevant legal standards. (Tr., p. 541, L. 10 p. 542, L. 13.) Taking into consideration Morrissey's character and the nature of
his crimes, the district court imposed a reasonable sentence. (Tr., p. 550, Ls. 1724.)
Morrissey argues his mental health and his young age should have been
considered mitigating factors. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) The record shows they
were.

The district court stated it wrestled with "two things" in relation to the

appropriate sentence. (Tr., p. 550, Ls. 14-16.) The first was whether Morrissey
was a "young man" who with experience and some punishment would realize the
errors of his ways and the second whether Morrissey was, as stated in the
psychological evaluation, "a person with an antisocial personality disorder" who
will resist all efforts at rehabilitation.

(Tr., p. 549, L. 22 - p. 550, L. 16.)

Balancing these two factors the court crafted a sentence with a lengthy overall
time to protect society, but a relatively short fixed portion so that Morrissey would
have the opportunity of release if he did rehabilitate. (Tr., p. 550, L. 17 - p. 551,
L. 14.) Morrissey has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in its

consideration of mitigating circumstances.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
judgment.

DATED this 23rd day of May, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of May, 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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